Search academic resources

Subjects / keywords: CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS; 210.1 R236r

Subjects / keywords: MIT PRESS; 149.7 R236r

Subjects / keywords: Psicología; General

Abstract Background The medications that are registered and available in a country are meant for the prevention and treatment of ailments and diseases. However, a lack of effective regulatory bodies and operative control...

ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a...

The aim of the paper is to is to explore the determinants of the rationality in decision making among polish stock market investors with different level of expertise with investing. Rationality in decision making was def...

Abstract According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarif...

Abstract The title really says it all, doesn't it?

This paper analyzes the day-to-day adjustment process of users’ behaviors in a transport network which is affected by relevant alterations such as disruptions due to critical events which cause the impossibility to use...

Abstract In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the 'a priority of our logical abilities'. In reply, Boghossian argued...

Discute-se o conceito de racionalidade presente em três vertentes da teoria democrática contemporânea: republicanismo, liberalismo e escolha racional. A análise concentra-se no republicanismo, para examinar seus micr...

Subjects / keywords: SCHICK, FREDERIC; PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS; 158.3 S353h

Abstract I discuss Paul Guyer’s contribution to the Cambridge Elements: The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant series. The author argues that Kant derives the fundamental principle and the object of morality from the fundamen...

Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a...

Instead of examining why organizations are dissimilar, this study explores why organizations tend to be increasingly and inevitably homogenous in their forms and practices. Organizations in a similar line of work are str...

This book is the result of a collective research effort performed during many years in both Sweden and Spain. It is the result of attempting to develop a new field of research that could we denominate human act informati...

Abstract The aim of this paper is to delve into the epistemological challenge surrounding the qualitative and quantitative aspects of belief and credence through a decision-theoretic framework: belief emerges as a cognit...

Parameter calibration of the traffic assignment models is vital to travel demand analysis and management. As an extension of the conventional traffic assignment, boundedly rational activity-travel assignment (BR-ATA) com...

IntroductionThis study investigates the cognitive judgment justification mechanism underlying consumer purchase intention formation in AI-based information environments, particularly within the experience-good context of...

UM DOS principais objetivos da ciência é mostrar que "o mundo é inteligível pela razão humana". Esta busca de compreensão racional tem uma história estreitamente ligada à história das ciências, mas também à d...

Según G. von Wright la actividad legislativa puede juzgarse de conformidad con reglas de racionalidad. Éstas permiten determinar si un instituto jurídico es satisfactible. Es satisfactible cuando “es posible que tod...

This paper proposes a reinterpretation of cognitive biases as adaptive tools in organizational decision-making and challenges the traditional view that identifies them as mere obstacles to rationality. By integrating bou...