Expressivism and Alternative Normative Concepts

In recent work – primarily the book Choosing Normative Concepts (2017) – I has presented what I see as a new, significant problem regarding normativity. Briefly, it has to do with the existence of alternative normative concepts. What if I know that I ought to φ, but at the same time I know that I ought* to ψ, where ψ is an incompatible course of action and the concept OUGHT* is an alternative OUGHT-like concept? I think that this kind of question raises many different issues. But one thing it does is to present problems for what I call ardent realism, a view which I believe often underlies what realists about normativity say and hold. Several theorists have suggested that expressivism somehow provides a way out of the problem I present, and my main aim here is to evaluate this suggestion.1 My conclusions are negative. Expressivism does not provide a way out. Or, more carefully: it does not provide a way out not already afforded by other views, and that has not already been discussed in the context of discussing such other views.