Rokowania układowe w sferze finansów publicznych po reformie z 2025 roku a standardy Międzynarodowej Organizacji Pracy

The purpose of this article is to assess the extent to which the Polish model of collective bargaining in the public sector, established by the Act of 5 November 2025 on collective labour agreements and collective arrangements, complies with the standards of the International Labour Organization. The central thesis maintains that the new regulatory framework ensures a high level of formal and procedural conformity, while a significant functional deficit persists in the sphere of public finances, limiting the practical effectiveness of bargaining processes. A doctrinal analysis of the Act, conducted in conjunction with the relevant provisions of public finance law, leads to the conclusion that the strict subordination of agreement content to the financial limits available to a given public‑sector entity, coupled with the absence of coordination procedures, tends to reduce collective bargaining to a dialogue lacking substantive normative effect. The article identifies key systemic barriers. These include the absence of temporal alignment between bargaining processes and the budget cycle, the restricted negotiating mandate of public‑sector managers, and the lack of mechanisms enabling the transposition of collectively agreed arrangements into planning documents. On the basis of a comparative analysis of selected Western European models and the interpretative practice of ILO supervisory bodies, several de lege ferenda proposals are formulated. They aim to embed fiscal constraints within the institutional architecture of collective bargaining through procedural instruments such as statutory negotiation windows, obligations to disclose relevant macroeconomic data, and mechanisms cushioning the financial impact of agreements. These measures could support the reconciliation of state budgetary sovereignty with the effective realisation of the right to collective bargaining.