UKRAINE IN MODERN GEOPOLITICS

The role of Ukraine on the global geopolitical stage from 1991 to 2025 is analyzed. Based on geopolitical conclusions drawn from the works of scholars such as H. Mackinder and Zb. Brzezinski, the geostrategic importance of Ukraine for maintaining the balance of power in Eurasia is demonstrated. Three geostrategic options that have been available to Ukraine since 1991 are identified, namely: neutrality; the attainment of regional leadership status; and accession to integration projects of external “centers of power” (either the EU and NATO or Russian-led integration projects). The geopolitical roles played by Ukraine since 1991 are analyzed. From 1991 until the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, the Ukrainian elite positioned the state as a sovereign “neutral player” (while simultaneously pursuing a policy of disarmament that contradicted the notion of genuine subject-level neutrality). Attempts to achieve the status of a “regional leader” were made but proved unsuccessful (for example, the GUUAM project). After 2004, the team of President V. Yushchenko was the first to declare the implementation of a pro-Western geopolitical vector. Within Ukraine, a complex and controversial process of geopolitical choice by both the population and political elites between two external “centers of power” began; this process was ultimately completed only after the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, in favor of the Western geopolitical vector. As a result of the consequences of misguided decisions made during the 1990s and early 2010s—particularly the inability to promptly and decisively choose a long-term direction for the country and develop a corresponding strategy, shortsighted disarmament policies, the oligarchization of the economy, and the corruption of the state administrative apparatus—along with the partial nature of Ukraine’s European integration efforts and the West’s unwillingness to accept Ukraine at the cost of conflict with the Russian Federation, Ukraine’s actual significance on the geopolitical stage gradually deteriorated to the role of a “buffer zone” between the West and Russia. Consequently, external influence on Ukrainian politics increased, and beginning in 2014, Ukraine became a convenient “target of aggression”. A post-2014 stage (and especially the period after 2022) is identified, characterized by the desire of the Ukrainian political nation to see Ukraine as a “forward outpost” for the United States and European countries, intended to deter the revanchist ambitions of the Kremlin. However, the necessary resources to transform Ukraine into such an “outpost” were not provided by the West, and real preparation for large-scale hostilities with the Russian Armed Forces—relying primarily on domestic Ukrainian resources—was not undertaken. As a result, Ukraine proved unprepared for a full-scale war. After February 24, 2022, Ukraine received assistance from Western countries; however, it proved insufficient to halt and repel the aggressor. Ukraine’s current geopolitical condition is defined as a “battlefield”, meaning that it is no longer even a role implying a certain active position, but rather a condition in itself. Three conclusions are drawn. First, if the full-scale war of attrition continues, external assistance remains absent or limited, and effective systemic reforms are not implemented within the Ukrainian state, Ukraine’s geopolitical subjectivity will be conditional, and the survival of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state cannot be guaranteed. Second, Ukraine must transition from the condition of a “battlefield” to a less destructive and more subject-centered state. Third, several possible scenarios for Ukraine’s further development are identified: the continuation of the “battlefield” condition; the expansion of hostilities to European countries; Ukraine’s exit from the hot phase of the current war followed by either the “bufferization” of Ukraine, with the subsequent risk of losing statehood; the “outpostization” of Ukraine (through effective mobilization of domestic resources and European assistance); or seeking security support from non-Western “centers of power” (for example, Turkey and/or India).