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Deflationism about Truth-Directedness

LUCA ZANETTI · UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência · 2023

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Abstract Contemporary views of truth-directedness endorse what I shall call the Common-Element Argument. According to this argument, there is something in common between judgment and other attitudes like assumption and imagination: they all regard their contents as true. Since this regarding-as-true feature is not distinctive of judgment - the argument goes - it can’t explain its truth-directedness. On this ground, theorists have been motivated to endorse an inflationary view that tries to capture truth-directedness by appealing to some further feature: intentions, second-order representations, sub-personal mechanisms, or subjugation to norms are the most discussed candidates for fulfilling this role. In this paper I will argue that the Common-Element Argument is unsound. It rests on a false premise, namely that there is some common element such as a regarding-as-true component between judgment and other cognitive attitudes. I shall reject Velleman’s and Railton’s defenses of the Common-Element-Argument. Then I will discuss three influential inflationary accounts of truth-directedness: Railton’s account, Velleman’s teleological account, and Shah and Velleman’s conceptualist account. I shall argue that they all face a phenomenological and an explanatory challenge. Finally, I shall sketch a deflationary view of truth-directedness that evades these challenges.

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APA 7

ZANETTI, L. (2023). Deflationism about Truth-Directedness. https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n4.lz

MLA

ZANETTI, LUCA. "Deflationism about Truth-Directedness." 2023. https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n4.lz.

Chicago

ZANETTI, LUCA. 2023. "Deflationism about Truth-Directedness.". https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n4.lz.

Harvard

ZANETTI, L. 2023, Deflationism about Truth-Directedness, UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência, available at: https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2023.v46n4.lz [Accessed 28 Jun. 2026].

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Título
Deflationism about Truth-Directedness
Autor / colaboradores
LUCA ZANETTI
Editorial
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
Año de publicación
2023
ISSN
2317-630X
ISSN
2317-630X
Idioma
eng

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