On Being Self-Undermining, Conciliationism, and Rational Obstacles

Abstract Several epistemologists reject Conciliationism on the basis that it self-undermines. They maintain that self-undermining positions are untenable. We argue that these attacks fail to show that there is something fundamentally wrong with Conciliationism. To this end, we examine carefully what the problem can be. First, we discard three inadequate diagnoses - we argue that being self-undermining neither shows that the view is false, nor that it defeats warrant in its favour, nor that it gives incoherent or inviable advice. Second, we develop our own diagnosis, according to which the problem is that the very belief in Conciliationism constitutes a (potentially temporary) rational obstacle for endorsement of the view, which means that subjects are unable to exploit their warrant in favour of the view. Unlike extant positions, on our construal of the problem, conciliationists should not be seriously worried by it, for it is not a serious threat for the plausibility of the view.