PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?

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PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?

Denise M. Rousseau et al · SAGE Publishing · 2019

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Autore / responsabile

Denise M. Rousseau et al

Editore

SAGE Publishing

Anno

2019

ISSN

1891-1803

ISSN

1891-1803

Lingua

Inglés

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Abstract This is the protocol for a Campbell review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of this systematic review is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict firm financial performance over time; a second goal is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict subsequent inaccurate financial reporting as manifest in restatement of accounting data due to errors or other distortions in reporting financial information.

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APA 7

al, D. M. R. E. (2019). PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1064

MLA

al, Denise M. Rousseau et. "PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?." 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1064.

Chicago

al, Denise M. Rousseau et. 2019. "PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?.". https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1064.

Harvard

al, D. M. R. E. 2019, PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?, SAGE Publishing, available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1064 [Accessed 7 Aug. 2026].

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Titolo: PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?

Autore / collaboratori: Denise M. Rousseau et al

Editore: SAGE Publishing

Anno di pubblicazione: 2019

ISSN: 1891-1803

ISSN: 1891-1803

Lingua: Inglés