Vztah Komise pro mezinárodní právo a Šestého výboru Valného shromáždění OSN a jeho vliv na mezinárodní normotvorbu

The article analyses the relationship between the International Law Commission and the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, applying the economic concept of the principal-agent problem. It shows that, on the one hand, States do not have all the information about the Commission’s activities, and on the other hand, they are not (unlike in the past) interested in directing the Commission and following up effectively on its products. Information asymmetry and States’ lack of interest in the Commission’s activities allow it to increase its influence on the development of the content of rules of international law. To do so, the Commission uses various tools – from the choice of the subject of its work (topic), the choice of the form of its product to the formulation of a recommendation. The products of the Commission’s work not considered and accepted by States are then often applied by international courts and tribunals. This may lead to the creation of rules of international law independently of the will of States, i.e., in a heteronomous way.