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Artículo

PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?

Denise M. Rousseau et al · SAGE Publishing · 2019

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Author / responsible party
Denise M. Rousseau et al
Publisher
SAGE Publishing
Year
2019
ISSN
1891-1803
ISSN
1891-1803
Language
English

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Abstract This is the protocol for a Campbell review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of this systematic review is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict firm financial performance over time; a second goal is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict subsequent inaccurate financial reporting as manifest in restatement of accounting data due to errors or other distortions in reporting financial information.

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APA 7

al, D. M. R. E. (2019). PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1064

MLA

al, Denise M. Rousseau et. "PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?." 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1064.

Chicago

al, Denise M. Rousseau et. 2019. "PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?.". https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1064.

Harvard

al, D. M. R. E. 2019, PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?, SAGE Publishing, available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1064 [Accessed 7 Aug. 2026].

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Title
PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?
Author / contributors
Denise M. Rousseau et al
Publisher
SAGE Publishing
Publication year
2019
ISSN
1891-1803
ISSN
1891-1803
Language
English
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