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Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design

Bengt Holmström; Paul Milgrom · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · 1991

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Author / responsible party
Bengt Holmström; Paul Milgrom
Publisher
The Journal of Law Economics and Organization
Year
1991
Language
English

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Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom; Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, The Journal of Law, Economics, and

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APA 7

Holmström, B. & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24

MLA

Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. "Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design." 1991. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24.

Chicago

Holmström, Bengt and Paul Milgrom. 1991. "Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.". https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24.

Harvard

Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. 1991, Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, The Journal of Law Economics and Organization, available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 [Accessed 5 Aug. 2026].

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Title
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
Author / contributors
Bengt Holmström; Paul Milgrom
Publisher
The Journal of Law Economics and Organization
Publication year
1991
Language
English

Subjects

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Principal (computer security); Incentive; Asset (computer security); Principal–agent problem; Economics; Law and economics; Management; Microeconomics; Computer science; Corporate governance; Operating system; Computer security
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