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Optimal Auction Design

Roger B. Myerson · Mathematics of Operations Research · 1981

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Author / responsible party
Roger B. Myerson
Publisher
Mathematics of Operations Research
Year
1981
Language
English

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This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design problems.

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APA 7

Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal Auction Design. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58

MLA

Myerson, Roger B. "Optimal Auction Design." 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58.

Chicago

Myerson, Roger B. 1981. "Optimal Auction Design.". https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58.

Harvard

Myerson, R. B. 1981, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research, available at: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58 [Accessed 8 Aug. 2026].

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Resource details

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Title
Optimal Auction Design
Author / contributors
Roger B. Myerson
Publisher
Mathematics of Operations Research
Publication year
1981
Language
English

Subjects

Explore related resources through these subjects.

Common value auction; Object (grammar); Nash equilibrium; Forward auction; Class (philosophy); Mathematical economics; Perfect information; Mechanism design; Auction theory; Combinatorial auction; Imperfect; Revenue equivalence
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